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TULSA LAW JOURNAL
Polygraphic Evidence: The Case for Admissibility
Upon Stipulation of the Parties
Introduction
As early as 1923, Dean Wigmore predicted, "... if there
ever is devised a psychological test for the evaluation of wit-
nesses, the law will run to meet it. . . ."' If a polygraph
test given and evaluated by a competent operator is such a
test as would fulfill Wigmore's prediction, not only has the
law not run to meet it, but in most instances, the law has
turned its back upon it.2 This note will examine the current
legal status of polygraphic evidence, and in particular, those
cases in which stipulation of the parties was made prior to
the examination. Emphasis will be placed upon the probable
future of polygraphic evidence in the state of Oklahoma.
The forerunner of the modern polygraph was a machine
developed by Cesare Lombroso in 1895, which he used to
monitor blood pressure variations of suspected criminals dur-
ing interrogation.3 In 1914, Vittorio Benussi, reported that he
was able to make a positive correlation between the rate of
breathing and deception.4 It was not until 1921, however, that
a machine which is the true forerunner of the present poly-
graph was developed. John Larson and Leonarde Keeler pro-
duced a device that was capable of making a continuous re-
cording of blood pressure, pulse rate, and respiration.5 The
only major change in recent years has been the addition of
electrodes which measure the change in the skin's resistance
1 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 875 (2d ed. 1923).
2 See generally Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir.
1923).
3 J. REID & F. INBAU, TRUTH AND DECEPTION: THE POLYGRAPH
("LIE DETECTOR") TEcImiQuE 1-2 (1966) (hereinafter cited
as REID & INBAu).
4 ScENric AwRmCmcI, Vol. 216, January 1967, at 25.
5 Id. at 26.
[Vol. 9, No. 2
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to the flow of a minute electrical current.6 While the exact
nature of the phenomenon is unknown, there is substantial
evidence to link these changes with attempts at deception.1
The basis for the correlation between the physiological
changes as recorded by the polygraph and "lying" is said to
be due to emotional changes resulting from the subject's con-
sciousness of his attempted deception.8 Obviously, the poly-
graph does not actually detect lies. That function is dependent
upon the competence of the operator and upon the thorough-
ness of his examination.0 The efficacy of the polygraph, then,
is based upon two factors: The reliability of the device and
the ability of the operator to interpret the "polygram."
Historical Background
To date, every appellate court which has ruled upon the
question of the admissibility of polygraph evidence, absent a
stipulation, has held it inadmissible. 10 Where the parties have
made a valid stipulation to have the results of a polygraph
test admitted into court, a few jurisdictions have held the
parties bound by their agreement and allowed the evidence
This phenomenon has been variously referred to as Gal-
vanic Skin Response (GSR), Psycogalvanic Skin Response
(PSR), and Electrodermal Response (EDR).
7 REm & IwBAU, supra, note 3 at 3-5, 219.
8 Id. at 196; Skolnick, Scientific Theory and Scientific Evi-
dence: An analysis of Lie Detection, 70 YALE L. J. 694 (1961)
(hereinafter cited as Skolnick).
0 For a thorough examination of the proper procedure to be
used by a polygraph examiner, see REm & IINAu, supra,
note 3, at 10-21; Wicker, The Polygraphic Truth Test and
the Law of Evidence, 22 TENN. L. REV. 711-12 (1953).
10 Appellate courts in Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii,
Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Minne-
sota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Caro-
lina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin, as well as
most federal courts have so held. For additional informa-
tion on this question, see Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 1306 (1952).
1973]
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in. The question of admissibility upon a valid stipulation is
discussed later in this note."
The present status of inadmissibility of polygraphic evi-
dence is a result of the decision in Frye v. United States,12 in
which the court examined the trial court's refusal to admit
evidence of the results of a Marston "systolic blood pressure"
test. Dr. Marston, who developed and performed the test was
not allowed to testify as to his conclusion."' The appellate
court upheld that decision, stating,
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses
the line between the experimental and demonstrable
stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twi-
light zone the evidential force of the principle must
be recognized, and while courts will go a long way
in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well
recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing
from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs.
We think the systolic blood pressure deception
test has not yet gained such standing and scientific
recognition among physiological and psychological
authorities as would justify the courts in admitting
expert testimony deduced from the discovery, de-
velopment, and experiments thus far made. (Emphasis
added) 14
The decision in Frye has been attacked on numerous oc-
casions; many authorities believe that it requires a higher
degree of acceptability for polygraphic evidence than for
other types of scientific evidence.15
Generally speaking, the standard for admission of scientific
11 See text accompanying notes 39 through 61.
12 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
I8 293 F. at 1014.
14 293 F. at 1014.
15 C. McCoamcK, EvmExcE § 203 (2d ed. 1971); 2 WiGMoRE,
EvmENcE § 663 (3d ed. 1940).
[Vol. 9, No. 2
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evidence is that it be acceptable to those familiar with its
use,16 and that a scientific device be reasonably accurate. 7
This lesser requirement has been used upon accepting evi-
dence of narcotics in the blood stream.18
At least one author has suggested that the standard im-
posed by the court in Frye is that which courts should use
only in taking judicial notice of a fact.' 9 Most courts, how-
ever, finding that polygraphic evidence does not measure up
to the Frye standard fail to apply the usual test for the ad-
missibility of evidence20 and refuse the evidence summarily.
In 1933, ten years after Frye had been decided, the Wis-
consin Supreme Court considered State v. Bohner.21 The de-
fendant had attempted to introduce a polygraph examination
to substantiate his alibi, but the offer was refused, and the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin concurred that it had been prop-
erly excluded. Relying at least partially on Frye,2 2 the court
10 Kaplan, The Lie Detector: An Analysis of Its Place in the
Law of Evidence, 10 WA=ms L. REv. 386 (1964) (hereinafter
cited as Kaplan).
17 Wigmore would have the courts grant recognition to scienti-
fic evidence upon a showing that the instrument or tech-
nique has a reasonable measure of precision in its indica-
tions, and that it is accepted in the particular profession
or field of science to which it belongs. 3 J. WiGmoRE, Evi-
DENCE § 990 (3d ed. 1940).
18 People v. Williams, 164 Cal. App. 858, 331 P.2d 251 (1958)
(acceptance of evidence of a reaction to the Nalline Test
for narcotics in the blood, even though only a few mem-
bers of the medical profession were familiar with it at the
time).
10 Kaplan, supra, note 16.
20 Evidence is admissible if it would, ... render the desired
inference more probable than it would be without the evi-
dence. . . ." C. McComwcK, EViDENcE § 152 (1954).
91 210 Wis. 651, 246 N.W. 314 (1933).
22 Id. at 657-58, 246 N.W. at 317.
1973]
4
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 9 [1973], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol9/iss2/4
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
stated that the lie detector2 had not yet progressed to the
"demonstrable stage, ' 24 but failed to clarify that terminology.
The first court to admit the results of a polygraph test 25
was a lower court in New York in People v. Kenny.20 The
court further allowed the examiner 27 to testify as to his opin-
ion of the defendant's guilt or innocence. The case was never
appealed, and were it not for the practice of New York in
reporting lower court cases, it would not have received any
notoriety.
The door which Kenny opened was slammed by a court
of the New York Appellate Division in People v. Forte.-2 8 The
lower court, being in a different district than the court which
decided Kenny, refused to allow the results of a pathometer
test in evidence. The convicted defendant appealed, leaving
the Appellate Division to settle the issue. The court found
that, ". .. The record is devoid of evidence tending to show
a general scientific recognition that the pathometer possess-
es efficacy."29 It would seem that the Forte court would have
required an even greater standard for admissibility than was
required in Frye. The opinion states that judicial notice of
the device's ability to perceive the truth would have had to
be shown.3 0
28 The test in Bohner was conducted at Northwestern Univer-
sity by Prof. Keeler, a noted authority in the field of poly-
graphy.
24 210 Wis. at 657, 246 N.W. at 317. The court further stated
that it feared, ". . . a too hasty acceptance of it during this
state of its development may bring complications and
abuses that will overbalance whatever utility it may
have. .. .. "
25 The test given was on a galvanic skin response (GSR) re-
corder.
2, 167 lisc. 51, 3 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Queens County Ct. 1938).
27 The examiner in Kenny was Father Summers of Fordham
University. His testimony was that the galvanometer
("pathometer") was essentially 100% effective.
28 279 N.Y. 204, 18 N.E.2d 31 (1938).
29 Id. at 206, 18 N.E.2d at 32.
80 Id. at 206, 18 N.E.2d at 32.
[Vol. 9, No. 2
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Because Forte was appealed and upheld by a higher court,
it was assumed that Kenny had been overruled. At least one
author, however, suggests that Forte and Kenny are distin-
guishable.31 Nonetheless, it has been Forte and the Frye ra-
tionale which courts have followed to this day. Any ques-
tion which remained was answered in People v. Leone 2 which
cited Forte and subsequently established the New York rule
excluding "lie detector" evidence.
Although the language in Frye, requiring that polygraph
techniques have "general scientific acceptance" has often been
cited as the reason for excluding polygraph results, it is cer-
tainly not the only theory upon which courts have acted.
Several attempts to introduce polygraph evidence have been
foiled by courts who have reasoned that the results of the
tests were too dependent upon the skill of the examiner.83
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, as well as several
other courts, has held that the admission of polygraphic evi-
dence would impair the function of the jury.3 4 Other courts
have held that it would be distracting to members of the
jury,5 or would lead to the abolition of the jury system.386
31 Note, Admissibility of Lie Detector Tests, 4 THE JoHN MIAR-
SHALM JOURNAL OF PRACTICE AD PROCEDURE 233, 251 (1971)
(In Kenny a proper foundation was laid for the lie de-
tector evidence, while in Forte, none was laid.)
32 307 N.Y.S.2d 430, 255 N.E.2d 696 (1969).
33 People v. Zazzetta, 27 IIl. 2d 302, 189 N.E.2d 260 (1963);
People v. Davis, 343 Mich. 348, 72 N.W.2d 269 (1955); see
also Skolnick, supra, note 8.
34 United States v. Stromberg, 179 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y.
1959); Henderson v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 45, 230 P.2d 495
(1951); Boeche v. State, 151 Nebr. 368, 37 N.W.2d 593 (1949).
3.r State v. Foye, 254 N.C. 704, 120 S.E.2d 169 (1961); State v.
Cole, 354 Mo. 181, 188 S.W.2d 43 (1945).
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At least two courts have excluded polygraph evidence be-
cause the device could not be cross-examined. 37
Regardless of the reasoning used, there can be no doubt
that the majority of courts still exclude polygraph results.
There is, however, some authority which points to a soften-
ing in the trial courts' attitudes towards admitting polygraphic
evidence. 8 In most cases, unfortunately, the defendant is re-
leased and the prosecutors fail to appeal the case. As a result,
these cases are never reported.
As long as the stringent standards of Frye are imposed,
there seems to be little hope for any drastic change. While
the current rationale persists, it would seem that individual
judges have the discretion to determine when judicial notice
of the polygraph's efficacy may be made. As yet, none has
dared to break with the years of precedent and the rule of
stare decisis. Perhaps it is time for another evaluation, in
view of the fact that considerable refinement has been made
in both the machine and the method since 1923.
Admission Upon A Valid Stipulation
During recent years there has existed in several states
a mounting trend toward admitting polygraph evidence where
a valid stipulation between the parties had been made prior
to the examination. The question most consistently asked is,
"How does the agreement of the parties lend credibility to a
scientific investigation which would not otherwise be given
judicial recognition?" At least one authority condones ad-
missibility in spite of any "imperfections" in the method when
37 State v. Lowery, 163 Kan. 622, 185 P.2d 147 (1947); Boeche
v. State, 151 Nebr. 368, 37 N.W.2d 593 (1949); but cf. State
v. Fields, 434 S.W.2d 507 (Mo. 1968) (Evidence was ad-
mitted that a trained dog had "tracked" the defendant. The
dog was not cross-examined.)
88 Ferguson, TEXAs B.J., June, 1972, 532 (Mr. Ferguson is a
polygraph examiner licensed in Texas. In his article he
describes a number of trial court cases in which he states
that polygraph evidence was admitted.)
[Vol. 9, No. 2
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the case at bar is such that the evidence is weak, and neither
side is desirous of having a decision rendered on that basis.3 9
As justification for this viewpoint, the followng considerations
are propounded:
1. Whenever opposing litigants and their respective
attorneys are willing to resort to polygraph examina-
tions, it may be taken for granted that the case is a
doubtful one- a case in which the evidence on eith-
er side is not particularly convincing (e.g., a bastardy
accusation and denial)... Polygraph test results . . .
would certainly be more accurate than the guess
hunch of the judge or jury in deciding the case in
the absence of assistance.
2. Whenever opposing attorneys agree upon the se-
lection of an expert . . . we may safely assume that
the person selected is an honest and competent ex-
aminer ... 40
The same authority has also urged that test results should
be admitted only upon stipulation of the parties, and as a
result neither party should later be heard to complain on
appeal.41
The case of People v. Houser42 was the first in which poly-
graph results were admitted into evidence as a result of a
stipulation. The agreement, made with the defense attorney's
consent and approval, was that the results would be admissi-
ble regardless of the outcome. The results proved damaging
to the defendant; he was convicted of a sex offense.
On appeal, the defendant urged that the test results were
inadmissable and relied on the Frye rationale, that there was
not yet any "general scientific approval" of the technique.
The court took notice of the stipulation, and in its often cited
opinion stated,
39 REim & INBAU, supra, note 2, at 247.
40 Id. at 247-48.
41 Inbau, The Lie Detector, 26 B.U.L.REV. 264.
42 85 Cal. App. 2d 686, 193 P.2d 937 (1948).
1973]
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It would be difficult to hold that defendant should
now be permitted on this appeal to take advantage
of any claim that such operator was not an expert
and that as to the results of the test such evidence
was inadmissible, merely because it happened to in-
dicate that he was not telling the truth. . .43
The Michigan Supreme Court had an opportunity to de-
cide this issue in Stone v. Earp,44 a civil case involving the
determination of title to a certain automobile. The trial judge
"instructed" the parties to take "lie detector" tests prior to
his determination of the issue. The parties, with consent of
counsel, executed a stipulation and submitted to examinations.
The results were introduced through the testimony of the
examiner, who gave as his expert opinion the conclusion that
the plaintiff was lying.
The plaintiff contended, on appeal, that the trial judge
had erred in giving weight to the test results. The Michigan
Supreme Court concurred, but upheld the decision due to a
preponderance of additional evidence. It would appear that
the court gave the stipulation no consideration, but in any
case the opinion shows that an insufficient foundation was
laid at the trial court.
In State v. McNamara,", "lie detector" results were in-
troduced in a murder trial upon the stipulation that the evi-
dence would be admissible by either side. At the trial, the
defendant insisted that the damaging evidence should be ex-
cluded. The court, relying on Houser, and reviewing the sev-
eral authorities against admission, held that the defendant
was bound by her stipulation.4
0
Four years later the Iowa Supreme Court made it clear
in State v. Freeland41 that the decision in McNamara did not
43 Id. at 695, 193 P.2d at 942.
44 331 Mich. 606, 50 N.W.2d 172 (1951).
45 252 Iowa 19, 104 N.W.2d 568 (1960).
46 Id. at 29, 104 N.W.2d at 574.
47 255 Iowa 1334, 125 N.W.2d 825 (1964).
[Vol. 9, No. 2
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apply to unstipulated polygraph tests. The court further de-
clared that a lower court could not compel parties to take a
polygraph test, or direct them to stipulate to one.
Without any doubt, one of the most important cases de-
ciding this question is State v. Valdez.48 The defendant, charged
with possession of narcotics, stipulated to a polygraph exami-
nation which proved to be unfavorable to his case. Over his
counsel's objection the evidence was admitted. Upon appeal
to the Arizona Supreme Court the question was decided in
favor of the admissibility of the test. The court indicated in
its opinion that the ". . . lie detector . . .has developed to
a state in which its results are probative enough to warrant
admissibility upon stipulation."49
It is not for the decision alone, however, that Valdez is
important. In its opinion the court set forth the first judi-
cially determined guidelines to be followed in future cases
involving stipulation. It, in essence, declared that stipulated
polygraph evidence would be admissible if:
1. The county attorney, defendant and his counsel
all sign a written stipulation providing for defendant's
submission to the test and for the subsequent admis-
sion at trial of the graphs and the examiner's opinion
thereon on behalf of either defendant or the state.
2. That notwithstanding the stipulation the admis-
sibility of the test results is subject to the discretion
of the trial judge, i.e., if the trial judge is not con-
vinced that the examiner is qualified or that the test
was conducted under proper conditions he may refuse
to accept such evidence.
3. That if the graphs and examiner's opinion are
offered in evidence the opposing party shall have a
right to cross-examine the examiner respecting: (a)
the examiner's qualifications and training; (b) the
conditions under which the test was administered;
(c) the limitations of and possibilities for error in the
48 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962).
49 Id. at 371, 371 P.2d at 900.
19731
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technique of polygraphic interrogation; and (d) at the
discretion of the trial judge, any other matter deem-
ed pertinent to the inquiry.
4. That if such evidence is admitted the trial
judge should instruct the jury that the examiner's
testimony does not tend to prove or disprove any ele-
ment of the crime with which a defendant is charged
but at most tends only to indicate that at the time
of the examination the defendant was not telling the
truth.
Further, the jury members should be instructed that
it is for them to determine what corroborative weight
and effect such testimony should be given.r0
Following the Valdez opinion came two Illinois cases in
which a stipulation was challenged. The first case, People v.
Zazzetta,51 has been cited both for, 2 and against53 the proposi-
tion that polygraph results are admissible in Illinois courts.
The court in Zazzetta did refuse to admit the test results,
but on close examination of the opinion it is clearly evident
that it was the stipulation which the court condemned, not
the test results. The court reported four pertinent errors which
caused the agreement to be defective. 4 In effect, each of these
could have been easily cured had the parties been aware be-
forehand of what the court would require.
50 Id. at 283-84, 371 P.2d at 900-01. A proposed stipulation form
may be found in Rum & INBAU, supra, note 3, at 251.
51 27 Ill. 2d 302, 189 N.E.2d 260 (1963).
52 Blackmon v. Brent, 97 Ill. App. 2d 438, 240 N.E.2d 255
(1968).
53 People v. Nichols, 42 Ill. 2d 91, 245 N.E.2d 771 (1969).
54 1. No foundation was laid as to the examiner's qualifications.
2. The stipulation allowed that the examiner need not ap-
pear and testify.
3. The stipulation was oral rather than written (even
though it had been made in open court.)
4. The gravity of the agreement may have been beyond
the defendant's comprehension who had only an eighth
grade education.
See also Colbert v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W.2d 825 (Ky.
1957).
(Vol. 9, No, 2
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In a second current Illinois case, People v. Potts, 5 the court
denied admission to the evidence because no foundation as
to the test method or qualifications of the operator was made.
Furthermore, the examiner did not testify; his written report
was merely submitted as evidence of his conclusions. The court
quoted the requirements set down in Valdez without specific
approval, but it would appear that in future instances, stipula-
tions complying with those requirements would be acceptable
to Illinois courts.56
At the present time, polygraph results are admissible in
six states when a valid stipulation has been executed.57 As a
general rule, it is a safe practice to follow the stipulation re-
quirements of Valdez, and avoid the pitfalls found in Potts.
With regard to the necessity of establishing the founda-
tion required for the admission of polygraph evidence, the
case of State v. Fields58 represents an excellent example. The
examiner should testify:
1. As to his training and experience in the oper-
ation of his polygraph, and to the technique used in
interpreting the results.
2. Regarding the mechanical operation of the poly-
graph, including the manner in which it recorded
blood pressure, pulse, respiration, and G.S.R.
3. As to the questioning technique, giving the
questions asked and the significance of each. (Includ-
r5 74 Ill. App. 2d 301, 220 N.E.2d 251 (1966).
" State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962).
67 Alaska: Pulakis v. State, 476 P.2d 474 (Alaska 1970); Ari-
zona: State v. Valdez. 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962);
California: People v. Houser, 85 Cal. App. 2d 686, 193 P.2d
937 (1948); Florida: State v. Brown, 177 So. 2d 532 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Iowa: State v. McNamara, 252 Iowa
19, 104 N.W.2d 568 (1964); Missouri: State v. Fields, 434
S.W.2d 507 (Mo. 1968).
58 434 S.W.2d 507 (Mo. 1968).
1973]
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ing a distinction between those questions designated
as "norms," "controls," or "critical").
4. That the subject showed abnormal or normal
responses when the "critical" questions were posed to
him.
5. That the graphic display on the "polygram"
corresponds to the reactions which the subject had
to specific questions.
6. That in the opinion of the examiner, the sub-
ject was or was not attempting deception in response
to specific questions.5 9
Certain difficulties must still be overcome. The exam-
iner's testimony must not be such that it completely usurps
the role of the jury60 and, under no circumstances should the
witness express an opinion as to the defendant's guilt or in-
nocence.61
THE CURRENT STATUS OF POLYGRAPHIC
EVIDENCE IN OKLAHOMA
In the past twenty years several cases involving the ac-
ceptability of polygraph evidence have been heard by the
Oklahoma appellate courts. It has been the standard practice
of those courts to declare such evidence "... inadmissible for
any purposes.16
2
The first case to come before the Criminal Court of Ap-
peals was Henderson v. State.63 The defendant, accused of
r, Id. A discussion of the questioning technique can be found
in REID & INBAU, supra, note 3, at 26-64.60 State v. Cole, 354 Mo. 181, 188 S.W.2d 43 (1945) (The court
expressed the concern that the introduction of polygraph
evidence would unduly influence the jury.)
61 State v. Galloway, 167 N.W.2d 725 (Iowa 1971).
62 See, e.g., Hayes v. State, 292 P.2d 442 (Okla. Crim. App.
1956).
3 94 Okla. Crim. 45, 230 P.2d 495 (1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
898 (1951).
[Vol. 9, No. 2
13
Frasco: Polygraphic Evidence: The Case for Admissibility upon Stipulation
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1973
POLYGRAPHIC EVIDENCE
rape, offered to introduce a polygraph test to prove his inno-
cence and to verify an alibi. The trial court refused its admis-
sion and the defense appealed, asserting that it constituted
new evidence of the defendant's innocence.
The appellate court, recognizing the case as one of first
impression,6 4 thoroughly reviewed the available information
and cases both for and against the admission of polygraph
results.6 5
As had been typical in all the recent cases discussed, the
court based its decision on precedent many years old. All of
the cases the court viewed were in some part based on the
Frye decision.68 Furthermore, the court looked favorably upon
a statement in Wigmore that ". . . the record of psychometric
achievement with testimony is still meager. . . ," even though
it was over twenty years old at the time.67 The court also
looked at the figures reported in Inbau's book 68 and empha-
sized the fact that the lie detector had been shown to be
only 75% effective.69 In the end, the court summarized by
saying,
... neither the lie-detector nor the truth-serum
tests have gained that standing and scientific recogni-
tion nor demonstrated that degree of dependability
to justify the courts in approving their use in the trial
of criminal cases.7 0
6 94 Okla. Crim. at 50, 230 P.2d at 500.
65 The court took into consideration the fact that only in
Kenny had polygraph evidence been admitted, but con-
sidered Forte as repudiating the former decision. The court
further reviewed both Frye and Bohner as well as J. INBAu,
LIE DETECTION AND CRIvINAL INVESTIGATION and J. WIGMORE,
PRINCIPALS OF JUDICIAL PROOF (2d ed. 1931).
66 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
17 94 Okla. Crim. at 52, 230 P.2d at 503.
68 The book in this instance was J. INBAu, LIE DETECTION AND
CsMUNAL INVESTIGATION.
10 94 Okla. Crim. at 51, 230 P.2d ht 501.
70 94 Okla. Crim. at 55, 230 P.2d at 506.
19731
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All subsequent cases on this question followed Hender-
son72 in refusing polygraph results in evidence. In no case,
however, has the question of admissibility pursuant to a stipu-
lation been considered. Only in Looper v. State73 did the court
make any reference to the stipulation situation. The court
quoted without further comment from an annotation7 4 that,
It would appear, at least absent a stipulation,
that courts almost uniformly reject the results of lie
detector tests....75
Perhaps it could be inferred that the court would at least
seriously consider the admission of test results obtained
under a stipulation. To do so would require that the court
overrule in part its prior decision that such evidence was in-
admissible "for any purpose. '76
THE OKLAHOMA POLYGRAPH EXAMINERS ACT
Both courts and noted legal scholars agree that the effi-
cacy of the polygraph depends almost entirely upon the quali-
fications of the operator.77 It is unfortunate, however, that
many examiners are not well trained.78 This is no doubt a
71 239 P.2d 812 (Okla. Crim. App. 1952).
72 Leeks v. State, 245 P.2d 764 (Okla. Crim. App. 1952) (in
which the defendant confessed to the examiner during the
test); Hayes v. State, 292 P.2d 442 (Okla. Crim. App. 1956);
Looper v. State, 381 P.2d 1018 (Okla. Crim. App. 1963);
Mullins v. State, 443 P.2d 773 (Okla. Crim. App. 1968)
(Polygraph evidence was held inadmissible for any pur-
pose.)
73 381 P.2d 1018 (Okla. Crim. App. 1963).
74 23 A.L.R.2d 1308.
75 381 P.2d at 1022.
76 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
77 See, e.g., Skolnick, supra, note 8; Inbau & Reid, The Lie De-
tector Technique: A Reliable and Valuable Investigative
Aid, 50 A.B.A.J. 470 (1964) (hereinafter cited as Inbau &
Reid); Wicker, The Polygraph Truth Test, 22 TEmm. L. REv.'
711-12 (1953); People v. Zazzetta, 27 Ill. 2d 302, 189 N.E.2d
260 (1963); State v. Gregoire, 148 A.2d 751 (R.I. 1959); Peo-
ple v. Davis, 343 Mich. 348, 72 N.W.2d 269 (1955).
78 Inbau & Reid, supra, note 77, at 473 (stating that only 20%
of the examiners practicing in 1964 were qualified.)
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result of the fact that polygraph schools generally attempt to
fully train examiners in a period as short as six weeks, with
no school currently offering a course longer than six months.7 9
While it may be said that a high degree of examiner in-
competence exists, it is also true that the use of the polygraph
in private business and government is becoming increasingly
widespread.80 To prevent the inequities likely to occur under
these circumstances, several state legislatures have stepped in
to either prohibit the use of polygraph exams for employ-
ment purposes,81 or, in the alternative, to establish standards
for the licensing of the examiners.8 2 There can be no question
that the quality of examiners must be raised and standardized
if the polygraph test is ever to gain judicial recognition.
Obviously, if the examiners will not establish standards
on their own through professional societies, then the impetus
must fall upon the legislatures. It is unfortunate that the
statutes already passed are relatively weak and ineffective in
doing what is necessary. A case directly in point is the Okla-
homa Polygraph Examiners Act.8 It is generally inadequate
in setting standards which would eliminate incompetent ex-
aminers.
It cannot be said that the Oklahoma Legislature passed
an insubstantial act, for, in its scope, it is quite comprehen-
sive. The Act establishes the Polygraph Examiners Board con-
79 Skolnick, supra, note 8, at 707.
80 The question of use in private sectors is beyond the scope
of this article, but for an excellent statement on this sub-
ject, see Menocal & Williams, Lie Detectors in Private Em-
ployment: A Proposal for Balancing Interests, 33 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 932 (1965).
81 To date, Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsyl-
vania, Rhode Island, and Washington have enacted such
statutes.
82 Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Mississippi,
Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, and
Virginia have enacted such statutes.
- OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, §§ 1451-76 (1971).
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sisting of five members, all of whom must be qualified poly-
graph operators."4 Several other states, on the other hand, have
set up similar boards without a requirement that members be
polygraph examiners themselves.8 5 Surely, other examiners
are better qualified to issue licenses than those having no
knowledge or experience of the device or its technique.
The initial transgression, however, is found where the
need lor high standards is most acute - in the section set-
ting the minimum qualifications for licensing.8 6 Rather than
set a high educational requirement specifying at least some
psychology training, the section permits licensing of anyone
who:
1. Attained the age of twenty-one;
2. Is a United States citizen;
3. Is a person of honesty, truthfulness, integrity, and
moral fitness;
4. Has never been convicted of a felony or a misde-
meanor involving moral turpitude; and
5. a Holds a baccalaureate degree from a college ac-
credited by the American Association of Colleg-
iate Registrars and Admission Officers, or, in lieu
thereof, be a graduate of an accredited high
tchool and have five (5) consecutive years of ac-
tive investigative experience of a character satis-
factory to the board immediately preceding his
application; or
b. be a graduate of an accredited high school and
a graduate of a polygraph examiners course
approved by the board and have satisfactorily
completed not less than six (6) months of intern-
ship training; or
c. have passed an examination conducted by and to
the satisfaction of the board, or under its super-
84 OxLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 1455 (1971).
85 Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi and Texas.
86 OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 1458 (1971).
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vision, to determine his competency to obtain a
license to practice as an examiner.8 7
The above standards should be strengthened by requiring
graduation from a polygraph course at least six months in
length for all applicants. Furthermore, a minimum of two
years of college education should be a mandatory prerequisite
for licensing. While the minimum requirements established
under this act are followed, no significant changes in the
quality of examiners can be expected.
CONCLUSION
There can be no doubt that in cases where the parties
have not executed a valid stipulation, polygraph evidence will
not be admitted into evidence. No court at the appellate level
has as yet been able to break with the precedent set in 1923
by Frye.8  The admission of similar results where a stipulation
was executed, while defying reason, does present an oppor-
tunity for courts to slowly bend away from the strict rule of
exclusion. In the near future, however, an attorney wishing
to offer polygraph evidence must comply with the stipulation
requirements in Valdez.89 (While these are not res judicata in
jurisdictions other than Arizona, at least one other state has
found them to be an adequate guideline, and the likelihood is
that other states will, also.)
For the Oklahoma attorney the question is still an open
one. It is likely, though, that this issue will arise in the near
future. When it does, it will be most important that the dich-
otomy in the existing cases be distinctly pointed out to the
court. Those cases involving stipulations have almost uniform-
ly been handled differently than those without.
In addition, more stringent licensing requirements should
be demanded of the legislature. Until the quality of examiners
can be standardized at a higher level, there can be no hope
that polygraph evidence will be better regarded by the courts.
Richard Carl Frasco
87 OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 1458 (1971).
88 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
89 State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962).
19731
18
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 9 [1973], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol9/iss2/4
